In the remainder of this article, my goal is to illustrate the nature and some of the repercussions of accent discrimination. In the process, I hope to demonstrate that accent -particularly when associated with racial, ethnic, or cultural minorities -is most likely to pose a barrier to effective communication when two elements are lacking. The first element is a basic level of communicative competence on the part of the speaker, independent of Li phonology and intonation. The second element, even more important but far more difficult to assess, is the listener's goodwill. Without that goodwill, the speaker's command of the language, i.e. his or her degree of communicative competence, is irrelevant. Prejudiced listeners cannot hear what a person has to say, because accent, as a mirror of social identity and a litmus test for exclusion, is more important.
After a more general discussion of background issues, the examination of accent discrimination, referred to here more specifically as language-trait focused (LTF) discrimination, is limited because of space considerations to the workplace and the courts. More generally this is the beginning of an exploration of why so many of us continue to use linguistic traits to rationalize and justify discrimination of all kinds -and to tolerate such discrimination, even when it is directed toward ourselves. STANDARD 
LANGUAGE IDEOLOGY
In matters of language history, structure, function, and standardization, the average individual is, for the most part, simultaneously uninformed and highly opinionated. When asked directly about language use, most people will draw a very solid basic distinction of "standard" (proper, correct) English vs. everything else. If asked for a more exacting definition, most will not be able to provide it, or will couch it in terms of salient features of nonmainstream language varieties: "Proper English is having your subjects and verbs agree"; "Why can't they see that the word is spelled a-s-k, not a-x?"; "[kwifi] -that sounds so ignorant." LTF discrimination stems primarily from the acceptance of a standard language ideology (a term coined by Milroy & Milroy 1985) . The definition used here is: a bias toward an abstracted, idealized, homogeneous spoken language which is imposed from above, and which takes as its model the written language. The most salient feature is the goal of suppression of variation of all kinds. 4 What is the source of the standard language (SL) ideology? How is it "imposed from above"? Who is responsible for its propagation? 5 SL ideology is part of a greater power construct, a set of social practices on which people depend without close analysis of underlying assumptions. In a thought-provoking discussion of the relationship between language and social power, Fairclough (1989:33) points out that this institutionalization of behaviors which originate with the dominant bloc (an alliance of those who see their interests as tied to capital and capitalism) functions to keep separate the powered and the disempowered:
Ideological power, the power to project one's practices as universal and "common sense," is a significant complement to economic and political power, and of particular significance here because it is exercised in discourse . . . There are . . . in gross terms two ways in which those who have power can exercise it and keep it: through coercing others to go along with them, with the ultimate sanctions of physical violence or death; or through winning others' consent to, or at least acquiescence in, their possession of exercise of power. In short, through coercion or consent.
The SL ideology is one route, and a major one, to establishing consent. There are four immediately identifiable proponents of SL ideology, all of which are part of the "dominant bloc": the educational system, the news media, the entertainment industry, and what has been generally referred to as corporate America. At the end of this article, I argue for adding the judicial system to this list.
The educational system and standard language ideology
Much of what the American educational system teaches children about language is factually incorrect; in this it is thorough, consistent, and successful across social and economic boundaries. The phenomenon has been observed by others:
It is a tribute to our educational system that the overwhelming majority of Americans have been instilled with a rocklike conviction that certain linguistic forms are correct, while others are wrong. Even those Americans who are uncertain about precisely which forms are correct are usually confident that to find the answer they need only look the matter up in the right book or consult the proper authority. (Burling 1973:130) These are strong statements, but they are easily verified. Everyone has anecdotes about language arts instruction from their elementary school education, but stronger evidence is available in a wide range of texts written for teachers and children. The underlying message is clear in each of the following examples.6 (a) A direct link between "nonstandard" language and lack of logic and clarity, with blurring of the written/spoken boundaries:
Almost any sentence or sentence fragment may be acceptable in casual conversation. In more formal speaking and writing, however, nonstandard grammar is rarely acceptable. We need to know how to speak and write Whereas only 26 percent of the private school students surveyed felt that HCE use should be allowed in school, 54 percent of the public school students supported this idea . . . Comments ranged from "Pidgin English fosters illiteracy," "Pidgin is a lazy way to talk; it promotes backward thinking," and "Correct English will get you anywhere" to the polar opposites of "Banning pidgin would violate our freedom of speech," "Pidgin is a natural language," and "It's our way to make For the most part, however, teachers are bound by the standard language ideology. For example, almost exactly 15 years after the controversial King case was decided in Ann Arbor, parents of African American middle school students complained to the school board about a teacher who allegedly had been ridiculing Black students for using their home language, specifically for saying ax instead of ask (Windsor 1993 :C1, C3).9
Standard language ideology is a basic construct of our elementary and secondary schools' approach to language and philosophy of education. The schools provide the first exposure to SL ideology, but the indoctrination process does not stop when the students are dismissed.
The media and the standard language ideology
The media -and by this is usually meant national broadcasting institutionshave taken on the job of defending the "national culture" (Cormack 1993 : 102-3), which means the propagation of a homogeneous nation-state, in which every one must assimilate or be marginalized. As part of this process, the print and broadcast news media and the entertainment industry take on the job of reinforcing SL ideology on a daily basis.10
Perhaps the most pervasive representative of the standard language ideology is the news media. This is accomplished, in part, by means of languageconscious reporting, which is prescriptive without factual basis. It is sometimes also overtly discriminatory. An excellent example of this is the Hawai'ian print media coverage of Governor John Waihe'e, whose code-switching between HCE and creole-accented English is made an issue, and whose grammatical "errors" are corrected (reported by the National Public Radio show "All Things Considered," September 12, 1990; also verified by the show's reporter William Drummond, p.c.).
More usually, complaints about language use are tucked away as an afterthought, but the underlying message is clear: there is a right and a wrong way to talk, and it is perfectly acceptable, even judicious, to censor and punish those who do not conform:
Residents of Brooklyn, New York, have long been known -and sometimes mocked -for their heavy accents. Ginny Most reports on a group of students who are trying to learn to talk right -or should I say correctly. The media claim that the intention is not to make news, but report it, and that they do not intend to serve as an agent of social change or an enforcer of norms. Of course, this line is crossed repeatedly by the media, simply by virtue of the topics chosen for reporting. In bringing to the public's attention the boom in accent-reduction schools, and by slanting the tone of their reports toward an idealized standard, the media become complicit in the process of discrimination.
The SL ideology is introduced by the schools; it is vigorously promoted by the media, and (as is shown in the next sections) is further institutionalized by the corporate sector. Thus it is not surprising that many individuals do not recognize the fact that, for spoken language, variation is systematic, structured, and inherent, and that the national standard is an abstraction. What is surprising, even deeply disturbing, is the way that many individuals -though they consider themselves democratic, even-handed, and free of ACCENT aDiscrepancy in some of the totals is due to the fact that one case (Patel) was settled out of court; two others had not yet been decided (Andrews, Kpodo) at the time of this writing. Table 1 provides a breakdown of 25 LTF-national origin discrimination cases heard in the federal and state courts and by the EEOC since 1972, with exceptions as noted. Further excluded or missing are cases which concerned the English-Only question (e.g. H. Garcia) and cases in which LTF discrimination played a minimal role in the plaintiff's arguments (C. Garcia, Bell, and many others). In some of the cases included, both racial and national origin discrimination were at issue. In most of the cases, accent, language use, and communication figured prominently in the testimony, argumentation, discussion, and final opinion.20
How widespread is LTF discrimination? The General Accounting Office of the United States Government (GAO GGD 90-62 Employer Sanctions, 27) conducted a carefully designed statistical study of a stratified random sample of employers nationwide, and reported that 10%o of their sample, or 461,000 companies employing millions of persons, openly if naively admit that they "discriminated on the basis of a person's foreign appearance or accent" (ibid., 38). In hiring audits, specifically designed to detect discrimination on the basis of accent (telephone inquiries about advertised jobs), such discrimination was found to be prevalent (ibid.).21 This type of behavior was documented again in Carroll, when an employment agency receptionist was directed by her manager to screen all persons inquiring over the telephone: to those who did not "speak right," the job was closed. The receptionist was also told to make notations about the caller's speech and accent (Carroll, 1173).
There are a number of possible reasons for the low number of documented cases. Employers who discriminate may do so in a nonblatant way; the persons discriminated against may be so accustomed to this treatment that they no longer react; if they are aware of the treatment, they may not know that they have legal recourse, or how to pursue it; complaints may be handled internally, and resolved before litigation becomes necessary. Of course, many people discriminated against on the basis of language may not find anything surprising or wrong about that fact. This is, after all, not the only society in the world that promotes a standard language ideology.
The bulk of the burden seems to fall, predictably, on the disenfranchised and the unassimilated. Cutler (1985 Cutler ( :1164 In some cases one must assume that a plaintiff may claim LTF discrimination when in fact none has taken place. Or there may be clear evidence of LTF discrimination which the court overlooks because there is, in addition, a bona fide reason to deny employment. In Dercach, the court felt that blatant LTF discrimination could not mitigate the fact that the plaintiff, while hardworking and knowledgeable, was illiterate. Because the job required close work with a written code book, and the ability to write multiple reports on a weekly basis, the court found for the defendant.
The courts have stated that "there is nothing improper about an employer making an honest assessment of the oral communications skills of a candidate for a job when such skills are reasonably related to job performance" (Fragante 1989:596-7). Matsuda 1991 calls this the doctrinalpuzzle of accent and antidiscrimination law: Title VII disallows discrimination on the basis of accent when it correlates to national origin, but it allows employers to discriminate on the basis of job ability. Employers claim that "accent" impedes But how can the courts distinguish an admissible business judgment, based on business necessity or personal preference, from inadmissible considerations, based on race or national origin? Is it simply a matter of presentation of the right arguments by the employer? Cutler 1985 has pointed out that employers are favorably predisposed to potential employees who are "like" them, and less disposed toward potential employees who are "unlike" them. Because the courts fail to recognize this fact, and refuse to reject the validity of the personal preference rationale, "Title VII becomes a statute which, at best, coerces job applicants to assimilate and, at worst, keeps them jobless" (1985:1166).
I proceed from the point where the plaintiff and the defendant have made their cases; the court must now decide whose argumentation better fulfills the requirements set forth by the law. It is possible to trace the influence of the standard ideology through much of the court's deliberations. The judges who wrote these opinions are willing to depend on their own expertise in matters of language in a way they would never presume to in matters of genetics or mechanical engineering or psychology. In Kahakua, the judge heard testimony of expert witnesses, and then chose to give credence to that witness whose testimony most closely matched his own personal opinions on matters of language use. In none of these cases was there any attempt to assess the communication demands of the job in a non-prejudicial way, and intelligibility was a matter of opinion only. How do some plaintiffs manage to win? Xieng provides an example of a successful case.
Phanna Xieng is a Cambodian-American who worked for Peoples National Bank of Washington. Mr. Xieng was repeatedly denied a promotion although he had an excellent work history, high marks in his reviews, and for an extended period had been filling in on the very position for which he was applying. There were documented comments from his superiors concerning his accent as the primary stumbling block to his promotion. In this case, the court could not overlook the fact that Mr. Xieng could carry out the job he claimed he could do, in spite of his accent, precisely because he had already been performing well at the job. It might seem that being on the inside -already employed by the defendant -would provide an employee with a valid LTF discrimination complaint with some strong evidence; but there are many other cases of denied promotion which were not so successful as Xieng.
Is it the case, then, that the plaintiff's chances of winning a LTF discrimination case depend to the greatest degree on the integrity and objectivity of the judge hearing the trial? Unfortunately, it is not so easy as this. It becomes clear later that, for some areas of employment, even the most open-minded of courts may be subject to the unwritten laws of the standard language ideology. Academic institutions were meant to be included within the scope of Title VII; nevertheless, the "trend in many courts has been to exercise minimal scrutiny of college and university employment practices, due, in large part, to the subjective factors on which many academic employment decisions are based" (Hou, 1546). They will intercede, but seem to do so with considerable forbearance for the opinions put forth by school administration. In addition, the courts have shown reluctance to reverse administrative decisions (ibid., 1958 Sparks and Edwards were built primarily on racial discrimination. In many pages of correspondence on the matter of Ms. Sparks's dismissal, the school administrator (Mr. Griffin) commented only once on the language issue: "Mrs. Sparks has a language problem. She cannot help the negro dialect, but it is certainly bad for the children to be subjected to it all day" (Sparks, 437). In Edwards, the discussion of language use is limited to general comments: "The plaintiff's contract was not renewed allegedly because of complaints received from parents and students . . . Several complaints concerned students' alleged inability to understand the plaintiff's 'black accent'" (Edwards, LEXIS).
Education
In both these cases, the opinions indicate that the heart of the matter was racial discrimination. In other words, if the accent issue had never been raised in Sparks or Edwards, these plaintiffs would still have won. This was fortunate for the courts, as it relieved them of the trouble of dealing with the matter of language and accent. In discussing the LTF discrimination portion of Sparks, the court limited its comments to one short footnote: "With no disposition to be unkind, we question, based on the spelling and composition of the two letters . . . the ability of Mr. Griffin to diagnose a 'languageproblem'" (Sparks, 442). The letters written by Mr. Griffin regarding the dismissal of Ms. Sparks, to which the court referred, were in fact poorly writLanguage in Society 23 (2) ten, and contained many spelling and/or typographical errors. Nevertheless, the court is clearly uncomfortable in chiding an educator (in this case, an administrator with advanced degrees) in matters of language use: "with no disposition to be unkind." More importantly, the court never addressed the content of Mr. Griffin's complaint -Ms. Sparks's "negro dialect" and its appropriateness for the classroom; it addressed only the superintendent's qualifications to make judgments on that dialect, given his poor letter-writing skills.
Would the court have thought seriously about this criticism if Mr. Griffin had written elegant, grammatically appropriate prose? if he had argued that Ms. Sparks's teaching effectiveness was compromised by her language use? It seems likely that the school system could have found a line of argumentation which would have pleased the courts; they failed to do so in this case.
The court neatly sidestepped the "concededly delicate subject" of LTF discrimination for Edwards as well: "The district court stated in its opinion that it was 'apparent' that the plaintiff could be easily understood and that there was no evidence the plaintiff made grammatical errors rendering her speech difficult to understand." In these two cases, the schools were deservedly punished for racial discrimination; for LTF discrimination, they were slapped on the wrist.
I return now to the Mandhare case, with which I began. Earlier it was established that Ms. Mandhare's contract as a school librarian was not renewed after that first year because her duties were thought to be compromised by her heavy accent, specifically because her "problems with speech and grammar made it difficult for her to be understood by students and teachers . . . plaintiff would do an excellent job at a school where her speech, grammar and story telling would not be so critical" (Mandhare 1985:238).
The official published summary of the case indicates that Ms. Mandhare then met with the Superintendent of Schools, and on the advice of her supervisor requested a transfer to Thibodaux Junior High School, as a librarian.25 The school board refused to reappoint Ms. Mandhare to this requested new position; testimony revealed that, in their private and public deliberations, Ms. Mandhare's foreignness and accent were discussed.
The trial court was very firm in this case: Ms. Mandhare had been discriminated against, and must prevail. However, the school's initial decision that the plaintiff could not teach young children because of her "heavy accent and speech patterns and grammar problems [which] prevented her from effectively communicating with primary school students" (ibid.) was never questioned. The court took this claim on faith, and instead stated: Defendant's contention that its legitimate reason for plaintiff's termination or non-appointment was that she had a communication problem because of her accent which prevented her from effectively communicat-ACCENT AND DISCRIMINATORY PRETEXT IN THE COURTS ing with primary school students is a feigned contention. Plaintiff was not being considered for a position which would require such communication. She was to be appointed librarian at a Junior High School, a position for which it was established that she was eminently qualified.
It is important to remember that in this case, as in every other case discussed, no effort was made to make an objective assessment of the communication skills required for the job, the plaintiff's speech, the quality of her interaction with children, or her intelligibility. The administrators found the plaintiff's accent difficult; they decided not to reappoint her to her job in the grade school. This alone would have made them the focus of the court's scrutiny (although not necessarily to the plaintiff's favor). However, they redeemed themselves in the court's eyes: they praised the plaintiff's industry and skill, and they went out of their way to locate a position in a school where her accent would neither offend nor inconvenience. The court could then focus on the school board, which refused to give the plaintiff this new job. The validity of the initial firing was never challenged. Thus everyone (except the school board) was happy: the administrators were left intact as arbiters of the SL ideology, and were lionized for their largesse; the court was not forced to challenge those educators on the factual basis for their decisions about appropriate language; and Ms. Mandhare was to be reinstated as a librarian, in a junior high school. The question remains: Were Ms. Mandhare's civil rights protected? Were her best interests really served? Put more controversially, if Ms. Mandhare had been forbidden to ride a public bus, and challenged that restriction, should she then have been pleased to be offered alternate transportation in the form of a bicycle, a Mercedes-Benz -or another, different but equally functioning, bus?
Ms. Mandhare did not really want the transfer to another school in a school district which had treated her so badly; she wanted back pay, which she did not get. Whether or not she would have been satisfied with the new position was never established, because the trial court decision was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:
The district court's determination that the Board had intentionally discriminated against Mandhare is clearly erroneous. The court focused on the wrong issue. It premised its conclusion on the Board's refusal to follow LeBlanc's recommendation that Mandhare be transferred to a junior high librarian position. That was not the issue as framed by the unamended pleadings and pre-trial order. The terrible irony of this reversal should be clear: Ms. Mandhare was originally protesting her dismissal on the basis of LTF-national origin discrimination; the judge in that first case chose not to deal with the delicate issue, but to bypass it completely by focusing on the possibility of a position in another school. This gave the appeal court an out, which it took. The appeal court accused the trial court of focusing on the wrong issue; and on that basis, it reversed the decision.
In the end, both courts were satisfied to let the school administrators and school board exclude on the basis of accent. In the analogy previously cited, the first court offered Ms. Mandhare a Mercedes-Benz when all she wanted to do was ride the bus. The appeal court said that the trial court had been wrong to offer Ms. Mandhare a Mercedes-Benz that did not exist and that no one was obliged to buy for her; it did not even question why she had been forced off the bus in the first place, and it certainly did not offer her the opportunity to get back on, or compensate her for her trouble.
The appeal court filed the reversal on May 2, 1986, six years after Ms. Mandhare was denied renewal. The failure of the American judicial system caused her untold emotional anguish and financial difficulty, and was detrimental to her health. Today she works as librarian for a private school in her home town of Thibodaux, but she will carry this experience with her for the rest of her life.
Broadcast-related cases
The Kahakua and the Staruch cases both have to do with the broadcast media, specifically with radio broadcasting. These cases are clearly very different from the others presented here because they involve decontextualized communication, in which heavier burdens are placed on the speaker.26 Nevertheless, they provide interesting insight into the court's deliberations on matters of language.
Mr. Kahakua is a native of Hawaii, a bilingual speaker of Hawaiian Creole and English; as a meteorologist with 20 years of experience and considerable educational background, he applied for a promotion so that he could read weather reports on air. Mr. Staruch, a native of Western Ukraine, wanted to read news on the air, for the U.S. Bureau of Information, in his native tongue. This time, the plaintiff was penalized for speaking Ukrainian with a stigmatized regional accent of that language. Both lost their cases.
If the courts are deferential to academic institutions in matters of internal administration and language use, they seem to be even more willing to defer to the standards of the broadcast media, even when those standards involve blatant LTF discrimination. The arguments put forward by employers in these cases and accepted by the courts involve the following elements: The Staruch decision has to do with the limited scope of Title VII: the EEOC commissioners who heard the case accepted the argument that Ukrainian speakers who had evaluated Staruch's speech did not like his regional accent.
The courts clearly have bought the argument that, in broadcast media, LTF discrimination is nothing more than good business practice; i.e., mainLanguage in Society 23 (2) stream language use is a bona fide occupational qualification. Kahakua's attorney, Richard Hearn, has put this more succinctly: The employer did not want Kahakua on the radio because Kahakua did not sound White ("All Things Considered," September 12, 1990).
Of course, the behavior of the courts follows logically if one accepts the premise that media appropriately embody the SL ideology, so that they should be entrusted with both the preservation and propagation of that standard, and the exclusion and disempowerment of those who do not subscribe to it. The whole concept of units of conversation in which two partners work toward mutual comprehension assumes a certain state of mind on the part of the participants. Work in accommodation theory suggests that a complex interplay of linguistic and psychological factors will establish the predisposition to understand. Thus Thakerar et al. 1982 conducted a series of empirical tests to examine accommodation behavior. They were not working directly with "accented" speech, but their findings are generally typical of such studies, which verify something known intuitively: listeners and speakers will work harder to find a communicative middle ground and foster mutual intelligibility when they are motivated, socially and psychologically, to do so. Conversely, when the speaker perceives that the act of accommodating or assimilating linguistically may bring more disadvantages than advantages, in in-group terms, he or she may diverge even farther from the language of the listener. 27 Roberts et al. 1992 (RDJ) point to the larger social context of language comprehensibility in the workplace, and demonstrate "how native speakers' assumption that they have the right to dominate and control, and the way that this is reinforced by the worker's lack of ability to negotiate the right to be heard, affect the detailed processes of routine interactions and their outcomes" (1992:35). All this work points to two crucial concepts not included in the employer's model of communication in the workplace. First, Linguistic competence on the part of the employee, taken alone, is insufficient for successful communication. Degree of accentedness, whether from LI interference, or a socially or geographically marked language variety, cannot predict the level of an individual's communicative competence. In fact, communicative competence can often be so high as to compensate for strong Li interference. RDJ provide an excellent example of this, in which an Asian factory worker tries to negotiate with his supervisor to obtain work for his son. The supervisor is at first unwilling to help, but the worker negotiates past the supervisor's reluctance. In their commentary on the exchange, RDJ (1992:40-1) point out that, in spite of strong interference from the native language, the worker shows several positive qualities.
(a) He is sensitive to context, using an appropriate discourse convention to set the scene.
(b) He is focused, and able to keep relevant topics "on stage." (c) He is able to compensate for and repair communicative difficulties: "For example, when there is a confusion over 'first' and 'fast', he reformulates . . . " (d) He is in touch with cultural differences, and is able to negotiate the supervisor out of "a gatekeeping role."28 A second crucial concept is that the burden of communication is shared, on every level, by both participants. If one accepts that good communication skills are necessary for job X, without further definition of those skills, one must still question the employer's claim that accent Y impedes communication. In fact, it is not necessarily the accent which is the problem, but negative subjective evaluation on the part of the listener. It has been shown, Language in Society 23 (2) in cases such as Dercach, that lack of goodwill can be as much of an obstacle to understanding, if not more. Matsuda (1991:1369 ff.) has pointed out the fact that no consistent, disinterested, fair procedures exist to verify these claims, and that development of such a protocol is imperative. This would provide an objective way to establish employment situations in which accent really is more likely to pose a valid obstacle. Thus claims made by the employer about the effect of accent on job performance would be subject to scrutiny that moves beyond the subjective and anecdotal. Of course, such measures are important precisely because accent, in the general sense that has been used here, can sometimes be an impediment to communication, even when all parties involved in the communicative act are willing, and even eager, to understand. In Matsuda's scheme, the full communicative burden might be placed on the speaker if (a) the consequences of miscommunication are grave; (b) the job is primarily oral in nature; (c) the setting is stressful, and time is of the essence; or (d) interaction is contextless, and restricted to one-time exchanges. Of course, this list could, and probably must, be expanded and revised. For example, there seems to be no real reason to take together the conditions of context and amount of contact; in fact, one can think of cases in which the context is indirect (over the telephone) but not limited to one-time exchanges (a dispatcher speaking to the same truck drivers many times every day). There are many communicative situations where the burden is not distributed evenly because the power and solidarity factors between speakers interfere (e.g. doctor/patient interactions); all these variables must be taken into account. In addition, the variables of stress and time need further definition and clarification.
When all four of her conditions are met (as in the case of a 911 operator), Matsuda suggests that the speaker's accent should then be evaluated in an unbiased, consistent way to determine degree of intelligibility -possibly by means of matched-guise testing. This is thought to be one way to ascertain whether or not the candidate is intelligible to the pool of relevant, nonprejudiced listeners. Obviously, the construction of an appropriate matched-guise protocol would be a challenging task, and one that the courts are clearly neither able nor willing to take on at present.
In other cases where only one or two of these conditions are met, there is room and opportunity for goodwill and accommodation, and it is reasonable to expect that the burden be distributed between speaker and audience. Here Matsuda draws heavily on legislation such as the Physical Disabilities Act, where reasonable accommodation is a major factor. of the listener, as well as a whole range of stylistic and discourse factors. However, there is empirical evidence for the general split between western European accents, which are generally seen as positive, and accents perceived as Slavic, Asian, or Hispanic. The fact that I was not able to document a single case of a plaintiff with a French, German, or British English accent is one kind of weak evidence, but there is more. Kalin et al. 1979 conducted an experiment in which students were asked to play the role of personnel consultant, matching taped voices of applicants with jobs characterized as "high" and "low" status. The "applicants" spoke with a variety of ethnic accents. For the highest status job, the students ranked the applicants in the following order: English, German, South Asian, West Indian. This order was exactly reversed for the lowest status job.
Many of these students will go out into the work force, and will someday become involved in the hiring process. They will continue to confuse their valid concern that employees be able to communicate effectively with the political and social complexities of accent. They will first judge individuals not on how logically or clearly they talk about themselves, their goals, and their abilities, but instead on the rhythms of their speech -rhythms which are linked to skin color, economic resources, or homeland. They will exclude and discriminate on the basis of language because they have been taught, by example, that language is sufficient and appropriate justification for this behavior. They will continue to hear with an accent: the accent of the intolerant, empowered mainstream.
THE LINGUIST'S CONTRIBUTION
If ideology is most effective when its workings are least visible (Fairclough 1989:85) then the first step must be to make visible the link between the enforcement of SL ideology and social domination. The educational system is the obvious point of departure, but that system is itself part of the dominant bloc. Given the way schools, the broadcast and print media, the entertainment industry, and employers work together to promote an SL ideology, the education of the public is both a lonely and a difficult task, but certainly not an impossible one. Beyond education, linguists have hard-won knowledge to offer which would be of some assistance in the difficult questions faced in matters of language policy. That knowledge is often not sought; and if sought, it may be summarily rejected; but in either case, it is often hotly resented. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to persevere, beyond the fact that the kind of linguistic dilettantism demonstrated here is damaging to our professional pride. This type of behavior causes real harm to real individuals, and it deserves our attention.
In the judicial system, there may be some lessons for linguists to learn from psychologists and psychiatrists, whose contributions to trial law are better established, although the effectiveness and value of those contributions are often challenged (Faust & Ziskin 1988) . Although the overall quality of psychologists' contributions to legal cases is still being debated, some issues have been clarified as a result of that body of testimony. The law now defines and takes seriously such human conditions as battered woman syndrome, clinical depression, and post-traumatic stress syndrome.
By contrast, although the courts have called on linguists to address technical matters of authorship and identification to be used as evidence,29 they are less interested in a linguist's definition of communicative competence or assessment of intelligibility, as was seen in Kahakua and Fragante, because these are areas they deem within their own powers of reasoning and expertise.
Xieng provides an interesting illustration of the status of linguistics in the courts. There was no expert testimony at all on the pivotal matter, which was the employer's claim that Mr. Xieng's accent was too strong and impeded communication. For most of the cases presented here, a list of questions could have been presented to linguists which would have met both these basic criteria. Questions about the process of standardization, differences between spoken and written language varieties, cultural differences in discourse style and structure which may cause processing difficulties, second language acquisition and accent, subconscious social evaluation of active variation, and change over time and space could be answered with reasonable accuracy. We could provide the judge and the jury with information and knowledge beyond that of the average layperson. But the issue is this: we cannot make them want that information, no matter how factually correct or how strongly supported by empirical evidence.
Linguistic contributions to the legal process are not valued because ideology intervenes in a way that it does not in matters of mental health. Judges may have no personal investment in accepting evidence linking systematic, long-term physical abuse with violent behavior; they are more likely to have Many times that number of citizens, born in the U.S., speak with a regional accent that is not fashionable, or are native speakers of a variety of English which is directly linked to race, ethnicity, or income. In a time when multiculturalism and diversity are held up as ideals, one might think that a standard language ideology would give way to a more realistic and tolerant approach to language use. Unfortunately, there is little evidence of this. LTF discrimination is a widespread problem which permeates much of our day-to-day existence. It is the site on which racism and ethnocentrism are institutionalized.
Some of the discussion around language standards is so emotional in tone that parallels can be drawn to disagreements between scientists and theologians over the centuries. In our own time, in the courts, science and rational inquiry have come up against public opinion based on personal preferences and intuition:
. . . the real problem faced is not legal but sociological. In the centers of population men have gone on assuming certain bodies of knowledge and certain points of view without realizing that they were living in a different world from that inhabited by a considerable portion of their fellowcitizens, and they have been unconscious of the danger which threatened them at the inevitable moment when the two worlds should come in conflict. (The Nation, July 22, 1925:28, cited in Caudill 1989:23) This editorial was written at the height of the Scopes trial, in which fundamentalists and empiricists argued the very definition of truth. It was a trial surrounded by sensational journalism, and followed with great interest by many people.
Scopes, a science teacher who taught the theory of evolution in a state which forbade him to do so, lost his case and was fined one hundred dollars. But something else, something perhaps more important, was won. Before the trial, one might gather that the majority of American citizens had never come in contact with evolutionary theory. After the trial, many of those people were thinking about their own beliefs, about science, and about the nature of authority and its relationship to knowledge. Whatever an individual's personal beliefs, after the Scopes trial it became increasingly difficult for anyone to dismiss out of hand the facts put forth by scientists. Today, more than 70 years later, evolution is taught in all public schools and most private ones.
The Scopes trial involved free speech, educational policy, and a range of sociological issues. When the topic is discrimination on the basis of language, the stakes are very different. Mandhare, Hou, Xieng, Kahakua, and the other cases like them test an even more basic freedom, the individual's right to be different:
The way we talk, whether it is a life choice or an immutable characteristic, is akin to other attributes of the self that the law protects. In privacy law, due process law, protection against cruel and unusual punishment, and freedom from inquisition, we say the state cannot intrude upon the core of you, cannot take away your sacred places of the self. A citizen's accent, I would argue, resides in one of those places. (Matsuda 1991 government agencies, the EEOC conducts the hearing, which is empowered by Title VII to hear discrimination cases; if they find for the plaintiff, they can order remedies. The federal agencies can appeal only to the EEOC. 20 Tracking down and documenting these cases was a matter of many hours in the University of Michigan Law Library. Certainly, cases have been excluded by oversight: there are no summary statistics kept by the EEOC, and no central logging system for these cases. Many cases are not summarized for publication. Thus no guarantee can be made of thoroughness of representation. The search for cases included in this article was concluded in May 1993. 21 This GAO study was conducted in response to a series of inquiries from Congress on the effect of the 1986 immigration laws. Not all the GAO's findings were clear or interpretable, especially in the matter of specifically accent-based discrimination. The report outlines a number of reasons for this, having to do with sampling and design questions. 22 Matsuda 1991 provides a thorough overview of the Fragante and Kahakua cases. 23 Dr. Jacqueline Macaulay, an attorney with a Ph.D. in social psychology, deals with family, employment, and civil rights cases; she has pointed out to me (p.c.) that the courts seem to be functioning on the basis of some "phantom legislature" which has mandated that a certain form of English is "Standard" and "unaccented."
24 It seems that three distinct kinds of expert witnesses testify in these trials: linguists (e.g., Charlene Sato of the University of Hawaii testified in Kahakua), speech pathologists, and "speech consultants." This last class is the most troublesome one, composed of those who teach "accent reduction" classes, or otherwise have a vested interest in the official commendation of a "standard English." Some judges, especially the judge who heard Kahakua, are very receptive to arguments of this kind. 2S Ms. Mandhare tells a very different story. In a phone interview, she indicated that her first year at the K-2 school was also the principal's first year, and that he openly admitted he had promised her job as librarian to someone else. He asked her to request a transfer, which she did not wish to do. After this episode, he told her in a one-on-one meeting that she had a "very heavy accent," although it had never been made an issue previously, and she had had no complaints from children or teachers. 
